




Machine Learning for SDN security: improving intrusion and vulnerability detection



Evren Tuna
6G R&D Engineer, ULAK Communications Inc.

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HISTORY



Young but Experienced

Massive but Agile

*Advanced but
Excited as day-one*



Radio Access Network

- LTE-A Base Station
- 5G Base Station
- OAM



Core Network

- ÇINAR 5G Core
- EPC for Private LTE



SDN

- SD-WAN (MAYA)
- SD-DC


Vertical Solutions

- V2X – Vehicle to Everything
- Mission Critical Communications
- Public Safety
- Private Networks

What is SDN?




- To make a network more flexible and easier to manage
- Centralizes management by abstracting the control plane from the data forwarding function
- Delivers a centralized, programmable network




Benefits of SDN

- Ease of network control
- Agility
- Flexibility
- Greater control over network security
- Simplified network design and operation

Types of SDN



MAYA SD-WAN



- MAYA SDN Controller
- MAYA ZTP Server
- MAYA BIG-DATA Platform
- MAYA vEDGE
- MAYA SD-WAN Gateway



MAYA SD-WAN

Routing

- BGPv4
- BGP Multipath
- OSPFv2
- RIPv1 and RIPv2
- SLA Aware Routing
- Application Aware Routing
- Static Routing
- Multicast*
- Segment Routing**
- Hybrid WAN

Tunnelling

- VxLAN
- IPsec VPN
- SSL VPN
- L2 over GRE
- L2TPv3
- DMVPN
- Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)**
- Full Mesh / Partial Mesh Hub and Spoke VPN deployments

QoS

- Application Aware QoS
- Bandwidth Limitation
- Bandwidth Dedication
- Random Early Detection (RED)
- Weighted Random Early Detection (WRED)
- DSCP Classification
- Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)**

Network Services

- DHCP Server/Client/Relay
- NAT mapping
- DNS Forwarding
- Dynamic DNS

Security

- Stateful Inspection Firewall
- Granular Access Control
- ICMP Type Filtering
- 802.1x
- RADIUS / LDAP/TACACS+
- Web Proxy
- URL/Content Filtering

Zero Touch Provisioning


- Device Authentication
- Remote Configuration
- Remote VNF Provisioning
- Zero Touch Replacement
- Configuration Backup/Restore
- Group Based Deployment


Monitoring & Management

- Topology Monitoring
- Auto Discovery
- Topology Health status
- Network Inventory
- Netflow,Sflow,Flow Statistics
- SNMPv2,v3,SysLog
- NBI(Rest API,Web Socket)
- Multi User /Role Support WEB Based GUI
- Multi Tenancy
- SPAN/RSPAN


* Development in progress

** SDN Controller feature





Attacks & Vulnerabilities in SDN



Attacks & Vulnerabilities in SDN


- Unauthorized Access
- Data Leakage
- Data Modification
- Malicious/Compromised Applications
-
-

Attacks & Vulnerabilities in SDN

- Unauthorized Access
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- Denial of Service
-

Attacks & Vulnerabilities in SDN

- Unauthorized Access
- Data Leakage
- Data Modification
- Malicious/Compromised Applications
- Denial of Service
- Configuration Issues



- It monitors the incoming network traffic to identify sequences and patterns that match a specific attack signature.

Pros:

- Easy-to-implement method on the network
- Proactively detects specific attacks in advance
- Operates quickly
- Significantly low false positive rate

Cons:

- A slight change in the signature can lead to the failure of anomaly detection
- Cannot detect previously unknown attacks
- Constant updating of signatures to combat new types of attacks

- Rather than searching for specific patterns associated with certain attack types, it monitors behaviors that may be correlated with attacks.

Pros:

- High sensitivity in anomaly detection
- Does not require signature updates for new attack types
- Does not need to expose itself externally for improvement and development

Cons:

- It may consider ongoing attacks as normal traffic
- Due to the analysis required for implementation on the network, it demands high effort for deployment

- Using ML, it analyzes data and monitors network traffic for network breaches.

Pros:

- Detect new types of attacks
- Independent on external sources for improvement and development
- It is open to performance enhancements
- It does not require pre-analysis of the network
- It is easy to implement with SDN

Cons:

- The false positive rate may be high
- The processing requirements are relatively higher compared to signature-based detection

Supervised Learning

- K-Nearest Neighbour
- Decision Tree
- Random Forest
- Neural Network
- Support Vector Machine
- Bayes' Theory
- Hidden Markov Model

Unsupervised Learning

- K-Means
- Self-Organizing Map

Reinforcement Learning

- Reinforcement Learning
- Deep Reinforcement Learning
- RL-based Game Theory

Semi-supervised Learning

* J. Xie *et al.*, "A Survey of Machine Learning Techniques Applied to Software Defined Networking (SDN): Research Issues and Challenges," in *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 393-430, Firstquarter 2019, doi: 10.1109/COMST.2018.2866942.

Objective: Coarse-grained intrusion detection
Method: DT, RF

Input: 10 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and anomaly

- C. Song et al., "Machine-learning based threat-aware system in software defined networks," in Proc. IEEE ICCCN, Vancouver, BC, Canada, Jul./Aug. 2017, pp. 1–9.

Objective: Coarse-grained intrusion detection
Method: HMM

Input: 5 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and anomaly

- T. Hurley, J. E. Perdomo, and A. Perez-Pons, "HMM-based intrusion detection system for software defined networking," in Proc. IEEE ICMLA, Anaheim, CA, USA, Dec. 2016, pp. 617–621.

Objective: Coarse-grained intrusion detection
Method: SVM

Input: IP address, Transport port
Output: 2 classes: normal and anomaly

- A. S. da Silva, J. A. Wickboldt, L. Z. Granville, and A. Schaeffer-Filho, "ATLANTIC: A framework for anomaly traffic detection, classification, and mitigation in SDN," in Proc. IEEE NOMS, Istanbul, Turkey, Apr. 2016, pp. 27–35.

* J. Xie *et al.*, "A Survey of Machine Learning Techniques Applied to Software Defined Networking (SDN): Research Issues and Challenges," in *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 393-430, Firstquarter 2019, doi: 10.1109/COMST.2018.2866942.

Objective: Coarse-grained intrusion detection
Method: SVM

Input: 3 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and anomaly

- M. Nobakht, V. Sivaraman, and R. Boreli, "A host-based intrusion detection and mitigation framework for smart home IoT using OpenFlow," in Proc. IEEE ARES, Salzburg, Austria, Aug./Sep. 2016, pp. 147–156.

Objective: Coarse-grained intrusion detection
Method: DT, BayesNet, decision table, Naïve Bayes

Input: 4 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and anomaly

- S. Nanda, F. Zafari, C. DeCusatis, E. Wedaa, and B. Yang, "Predicting network attack patterns in SDN using machine learning approach," in Proc. IEEE NFV-SDN, Palo Alto, CA, USA, Nov. 2016, pp. 167–172.

Objective: Coarse-grained intrusion detection
Method: Deep NN

Input: 6 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and anomaly

- T. A. Tang, L. Mhamdi, D. McLernon, S. A. R. Zaidi, and M. Ghogho, "Deep learning approach for network intrusion detection in software defined networking," in Proc. IEEE WINCOM, Fes, Morocco, Oct. 2016, pp. 258–263.

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Objective: Coarse-grained intrusion detection
Method: Recurrent NN

Input: 6 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and anomaly

- T. Tang, S. A. R. Zaidi, D. McLernon, L. Mhamdi, and M. Ghogho, "Deep recurrent neural network for intrusion detection in SDN-based networks," in Proc. IEEE NetSoft, Montreal, QC, Canada, 2018, pp. 1–5.

Objective: Fine-grained intrusion detection
Method: SVM

Input: 23 features
Output: 5 classes: normal, DoS, U2R, R2L, Probe

- P. Wang, K.-M. Chao, H.-C. Lin, W.-H. Lin, and C.-C. Lo, "An efficient flow control approach for SDN-based network threat detection and migration using support vector machine," in Proc. IEEE ICEBE, Macau, China, Nov. 2016, pp. 56–63.

Objective: Fine-grained intrusion detection
Method: RF

Input: 41 features
Output: 5 classes: normal, DoS, U2R, R2L, Probe

- N. Shone, T. N. Ngoc, V. D. Phai, and Q. Shi, "A deep learning approach to network intrusion detection," *IEEE Trans. Emerg. Topics Comput. Intell.*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 41–50, Feb. 2018.

* J. Xie *et al.*, "A Survey of Machine Learning Techniques Applied to Software Defined Networking (SDN): Research Issues and Challenges," in *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 393-430, Firstquarter 2019, doi: 10.1109/COMST.2018.2866942.

Objective: DDoS attack detection
Method: SOM

Input: 6 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and DDoS

- R. Braga, E. Mota, and A. Passito, "Lightweight DDoS flooding attack detection using NOX/OpenFlow," in Proc. IEEE LCN, Denver, CO, USA, Oct. 2010, pp. 408–415.

Objective: DDoS attack detection
Method: Naïve Bayes, k-NN, k-means, k-medoids

Input: -
Output: 5 classes: normal and DDoS

- L. Barki, A. Shidling, N. Meti, D. G. Narayan, and M. M. Mulla, "Detection of distributed denial of service attacks in software defined networks," in Proc. IEEE ICACCI, Jaipur, India, Sep. 2016, pp. 2576–2581.

Objective: DDoS attack detection
Method: Deep NN

Input: 20 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and DDoS

- C. Li et al., "Detection and defense of DDoS attack-based on deep learning in OpenFlow-based SDN," Int. J. Commun. Syst., vol. 31, no. 5, 2018.

* J. Xie *et al.*, "A Survey of Machine Learning Techniques Applied to Software Defined Networking (SDN): Research Issues and Challenges," in *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 393-430, Firstquarter 2019, doi: 10.1109/COMST.2018.2866942.

Objective: DDoS attack detection
Method: Deep NN

Input: 68 features

Output: 8 classes: normal and 7 types of DDoS

- Q. Niyaz, W. Sun, and A. Y. Javaid, "A deep learning based DDoS detection system in software-defined networking (SDN)," arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.07400, 2016.

Objective: Application fault detection
Method: ML approaches

- L. J. Jagadeesan and V. Mendiratta, "Programming the network: Application software faults in software-defined networks," in Proc. IEEE ISSREW, Ottawa, ON, Canada, Oct. 2016, pp. 125–131.

Objective: Firewall performance optimization
Method: Neural network, HMM

- Z. Din and J. de Oliveira, "Anomaly free on demand stateful software defined firewalling," in Proc. IEEE ICCCN, Vancouver, BC, Canada, Jul. 2017, pp. 1–9.

* J. Xie *et al.*, "A Survey of Machine Learning Techniques Applied to Software Defined Networking (SDN): Research Issues and Challenges," in *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 393-430, Firstquarter 2019, doi: 10.1109/COMST.2018.2866942.

Objective: DDoS attack detection
Method: XGBoost

Input: 41 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and DDoS

- Z. Chen, F. Jiang, Y. Cheng, X. Gu, W. Liu and J. Peng, "XGBoost Classifier for DDoS Attack Detection and Analysis in SDN-Based Cloud," *2018 IEEE International Conference on Big Data and Smart Computing (BigComp)*, Shanghai, China, 2018, pp. 251-256, doi: 10.1109/BigComp.2018.00044.


Objective: DDoS attack detection
Method: CNN, RNN

Input: 80 features
Output: 2 classes: normal and DDoS

- S. Haider *et al.*, "A Deep CNN Ensemble Framework for Efficient DDoS Attack Detection in Software Defined Networks," in *IEEE Access*, vol. 8, pp. 53972-53983, 2020, doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2976908.

- Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity → <https://www.unb.ca/cic/>
- Iman Sharafaldin, Arash Habibi Lashkari, and Ali A. Ghorbani, "Toward Generating a New Intrusion Detection Dataset and Intrusion Traffic Characterization", 4th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy (ICISSP), Portugal, January 2018.


Problem Definition



Problem Definition

- We expect to get a security solution that operates on an SDN infrastructure and is capable of detecting attacks based on metrics obtained from traffic flows.
- We provide necessary measures to enhance the SDN solution.
- This solution is targeted towards addressing a real-world problem that we are focusing on.
- You can envision it as being integrated with the ULAK Maya SDN platform. Our aim is to draw attention to this research area and highlight its importance.

Problem Definition



- **Classification problem**
 - Normal, DDoS, Malware, Web-based
- **Dataset**
 - A time-labelled dataset
 - Training and validation sets
 - Test set will not be shared
- **Inputs**
 - 79 features
- **Outputs**
 - Normal, DDoS, Malware, Web-based

Evaluation Criteria

- Classification problem
- The challenge teams will share their technical reports and codes with ULAK challenge team.
- The technical report is expected to be in pdf format. Participants are expected to explain their solution, including the outcomes of their models.

- There will be no restriction for the ML models. Participants are required to provide an explanation for their choice of ML model.
- Additionally, the performance of the selected ML model should be compared with at least three baseline ML models.
- The selection of baseline models should be well-known and aligned with prior art, and the specific choice of baseline models can be determined by the participants.
- Labels:
 - DoS Hulk, BENIGN, DDoS, PortScan, DoS GoldenEye, FTP-Patator, DoS slowloris, DoS Slowhttpptest, SSH-Patator, Web Attack – XSS, Web Attack - Brute Force, Web Attack – Sql, Injection, Bot, Infiltration, Heartbleed

- For each label, the criteria must be as follow:
 - The criteria will cover a maximum False Positive value, i.e., 10%.
 - Accuracy must be at least 90%.
 - Recall and precision be at least 90%.
 - The performance evaluation considers K-fold cross validation.

- The ML model with less complexity is preferred when two models achieve similar performance.
- ULAK Comm. will use another test dataset to evaluate the model performances.
- Challenge teams are free to use any tools or APIs.

Timeline



- Registration: 29 May - 25 August 2023
 - Submission deadline: 31 August 2023
 - Evaluation: 31 October
 - Grand Challenge finale (awards): 13 Dec.
-
- Link: <https://challenge.aiforgood.itu.int/match/matchitem/81>

Challenge Team



Evren Tuna
6G R&D Engineer

evren.tuna@ulakhaberlesme.com.tr



Abdullah Mekki
Network & Systems Engineer

abdullah.mekki@ulakhaberlesme.com.tr

Thank You!

Evren Tuna

evren.tuna@ulakhaberlesme.com.tr

 /evrentuna

 Ulakhaberlesme  @Ulakhaberlesme  info@ulakhaberlesme.com.tr